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TOWARD A GREENER GATT:
ENVIRONMENTAL TRADE MEASURES
AND THE SHRIMP-TURTLE CASE
HOWARD F. CHANG*

The World Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate B ody issued the
most important ruling to date on the status of environmental trade measures
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)1 in its 1998
report in the "shrimp-turtle" case.2 At issue in this case was section 609 of
Public Law 10 1- 162,3 a U. S . statute that the U.S . C ourt of International

Trade had interpreted as a ban on shrimp imports from countries not
certified by the United S tates as having adopted "a regulatory program
governing the incidental taking of .. . sea turtles ... that is comparable to
that of the United S tates . "4 The United States adopted s uch a program to
promote the conservation of sea turtles, which are endangered species.
This program includes a requirement that U .S . trawlers use turtle excluder
devices (TEDs) to protect sea turtles from incidental capture and drowning
in shrimping nets. India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand complained that
the U . S . ban on shrimp imports violated GATT Article XI,5 which prohibits
*
Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School; member of the University of
Southern California Law School faculty, 1992-1999. © 2000 Howard F. Chang, all rights reserved. I
wish to thank Richard Parker and Curtis Reitz for helpful comments on an earlier draft and participants
at the Round-Table Conference on Conservation and Management of Marine Living Resources and
International Trade Policy, sponsored by the Institute of Cetacean Research in Tokyo, Japan, for

comments on a paper that provided the basis for this essay.
1.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-ll, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
2.
Report of the Appellate Body on U.S. Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, Oct. 12, 1998, 38 I.L.M. 118 (1999) [hereinafter Appellate Body].
3.

Sea Turtle Conservation Amendments to the Endangered Species Act, Pub. L. 101-162, sec.

609, 103 Stat. 988, 1037 (Nov. 21, 1989) (amending 16 U.S.C. § 1537 (1994)).
4.
!d. sec. 609(b)(2)(A). See Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 20 Ct. Int'l Trade 1221 (1996),
vacated sub nom. Earth Island Inst. v. Albright, 147 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
5.

GATT art. Xl.
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quantitative restrictions on imports, and requested that a WTO panel settle
their dispute with the United States.
Given the hostile attitude toward environmental trade

measures

reflected in past panel decisions under the GATT, the WTO Appellate
Body's ruling in the shrimp-turtle case represents a significant step toward
more liberal treatment of these measures under the GATT. In stark contrast
to the consistent pattern in those past decisions, the Appellate Body upheld
the statute in dispute and objected only to very specific aspects of its
implementation.

The ruling suggests that countries can defend unilateral

import bans as permissible environmental measures under the GATT as
long as they avoid unfair discrimination.

The result was a decision much

more sensitive to environmental interests than expected.

In this essay, I

will draw upon my past writings, which have criticized GATT panels for
their hostile treatment of environmental trade measures,6 to argue that the
WTO Appellate Body's decision brings GATT case law much closer to a
reasonable balance between environmental and trade interests.
The shrimp-turtle decision endorses the general type of case-by-case
review proposed in my prior work.7

The Appellate Body' s ruling in this

case, however, has generated some confusion regarding the standard that
WTO panels should apply to environmental trade measures in the future.
This confusion, in turn, has generated some controversy regarding what the
United States must do in order to bring its turtle conservation policies into
compliance with the GATT.8

In this essay, I will argue in favor of an

interpretation of the shrimp-turtle decision that preserves broad leeway for
the use of environmental trade measures.

I will argue that a more

restrictive interpretation of the ruling would be inconsistent with the
Appellate Body's close attention to the text of the GATT.
I. TOWARD MORE LIBERAL TREATMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
TRADE MEASURES
The United States defended its ban on shrimp imports as a measure
falling within GATT Article XX, which sets forth general exceptions from
6.
Howard F. Chang, An Economic Analysis of Trade Measures to Protect rhe Global
Environment, 83 GEO. L.J. 2131 (1995) [hereinafter Chang, Trade Measures]; Howard F. Chang,
Carrots, Sticks, and Intemarional Externalities, 17 lNT'L REV. L. & ECON. 309 (1997) [hereinafter
Chang, International Externalities].
7. See sources cited supra note 6.
See Asians Conies£ U.S. Shrimp!Jurtle Rule, Call for Complele Lifting of Imparl Ban, 16
8.
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1250 (July 28, 1999); Daniel Pruzin, Malaysia, U.S. Reach Modus Vivendi on
WTO Shrimp-Turlle Row; India Next, 17 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 82 (Jan. 20, 2000).
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the obligations set forth elsewhere i n the GATT. In particular, Article XX
states, in pertinent part:

'

Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbi tra ry or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a
disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any
contracting party of measures:

(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;

(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption;
9

In May 1998, the WTO panel nevertheless ruled against the United
States.10
When the United States lost before the WTO panel in the shrimp-turtle
case, it was the third time in a row that a dispute-settlement panel had held
that the United States had violated the GATT by banning imports harvested
in a manner harmful to marine life.

Pursuant to the Marine Mammal

Protection Act (MMP A), 11 the United States has banned imports of tuna
from countries that have not adopted programs to protect dolphins
comparable to the U.S. program.

In 1991 and again in 1994, dispute

settlement panels held that the MMPA violated the GATT. 12 Both those
GATT panels, like the WTO panel in the shrimp-turtle case, ruled against
the United States on grounds so general and sweeping that they left little
scope for trade measures to protect the global environment.

The GATT

Council, however, adopted neither of the "tuna-dolphin" panel reports,
which therefore never became legally binding.
In the shrimp-turtle case, the United States appealed the panel's ruling
to the WTO Appellate Body, which in October 1998 also ruled against the
9.
GATT art. XX.
See WTO Panel Report on U.S. Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
10.
M ay 15, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 832 (1998) [hereinafter 1998 Panel].
M arine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1421h (1994).
11.
See GATT Panel Report on U.S. Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, May 20, 1994, 33 I.L.M.
12.
839 (1994) (hereinafter 1994 Panel]; GATT Panel Report on U.S. Restrictions on Imports of Tuna,
Aug. 16, 1991, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155 (1993) [hereinafter 1991 Panel].
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United States, but on much narrower grounds than the panel below. In its
ruling, the Appellate Body used much better legal reasoning than that seen
in past panel decisions, with much closer attention to the plain meaning of
the language in GATT Article XX. For example, in the shrimp-turtle case
the panel below required that the type of measure allowed under Article
XX "not undermine the WTO multilateral trading system,"13 a requirement
that echoed a concern expressed by both the 1991 and 1994 tuna-dolphin
panels. 14 The Appellate Body explicitly rejected this requirement as "a test
that finds no basis ... in the text" of Article XX.15

This attention to the

treaty text is itself significant, because each of the prior panel decisions
ruled against the United States based on requirements that the panels
invented without any support in the text of Article XX. 16 Critics of those
past decisions, including this author, have urged a more literal reading of
Article XX,

which

implies

a

broader

reading

of

the

Article

XX

exceptions.17
A. PROCESSES AND RESOURCES OUTSIDE THE JURISDICTION OF THE
IMPORTING COUNTRY

The Appellate Body agreed that section 609 was a measure "'relating
to' the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource."18

Therefore, the

Appellate Body concluded that the statute came within the exception in
Article XX(g) despite the fact that section 609 called for a unilateral ban on
imports based on the process by which they were made or harvested
outside the United States. These types of attempts to influence production
and process methods (PPMs) outside the jurisdiction of the importing
country have been anathema to many in the GATT community, and some
have since expressed alarm that the Appellate Body decision apparently
allows the use of these process standards.

Thailand, for example,

complained that the decision "will result in an explosive growth in the
13.
14.

1998 Panel, supra note 10, para. 7.44.
See 1994 Panel, supra note 12, para. 5.26; 1991 Panel, supra note 12, para. 5.27.

Appellate Body, supra note 2, para. 121.
See Chang, Trade Measures, supra note 6, at 2145; Carrie Wofford, Note, A Greener Future
at the WTO: The Refinement of WTO Jurisprudence on Environmental Exceptions to GATT, 24 HARY.
ENYTL. L. REV. 563, 573 (2000) ("Through a more literal interpretation of the text of Article XX, the
15.
16.

Appellate Body has abandoned several tests . . .that prior panels had imposed . .. that had no basis in
the actual language of Article XX.").
17.
See, e.g., Chang, Trade Measures, supra note 6, at 2172-75; Robert Howse, The Turtles
Panel: Another Environmental Disaster in Geneva, J. WORLD TRADE, Oct. 1998, at 73.
18. Appellate Body, supra note 2, para. 142.
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number of environmental ... measures applied to PPMs and justified
. le XX."19
pursuant to ArtiC
Expressing similar concerns, the 1991 tuna-dolphin panel ruled that
the MMPA could not come within the Article XX exceptions because it
sought to protect dolphins from fishing fleets outside the jurisdiction of the
United States.20

The Appellate Body holding in the shrimp-turtle case

rejects that particular jurisdictional requirement, so it does not rule against
the U.S. import ban because it seeks to protect sea turtles from activities

outside U.S. jurisdiction. The opinion, however, leaves open the question
of whether there may be

some

jurisdictional limitation implicit in Article

XX(g):

We do not pass upon the question of whether there is an implied
jurisdictional limitation in Article XX(g), and if so, the nature or extent
of that limitation. We note only that in the specific circumstances of the
case before us, there is a sufficient nexus between the migratory and
endangered marine populations involved and the United States for
purposes of Article XX(g) .21
The opinion hints that it might be relevant that sea turtles migrate through
U.S. territory, and consequently several commentators have suggested that
such a nexus may be necessary to justify an environmental trade measure
under Article XX(g).22
The Appellate Body, however, expressly declined to rule on whether
such a nexus is actually required, and the reasoning in the opinion militates
against any such jurisdictional requirement. Such a requirement would be
inconsistent with the Appellate Body's emphasis on the text of Article XX.
19.

Daniel Pruzin, WTO Formally Adopts Shrimp-Turrle Ruling as Thailand Fears Victory May

Be Pyrrhic, 15 Int'1 Trade Rep. (BNA) 1884, 1885 (Nov. 11, 1998).

20.

See 1991 Panel, supra note 12, paras. 5.25, 32

21.

Appellate Body, supra note 2, para. 133.

22.

See, e.g., Patricia Isela Hansen, Transparency, Standards of Review, and rhe Use of Trade

.

.

Measures ro Protecr rhe Global Environmenr, 39 VA. J. lNT'L L. 1017, 1057 (1999) ("States may

permissibly use trade measures to protect resources outside their territorial jurisdiction so long as . . .
the state has a sufficient 'nexus' with those resources . . . . "); Nancy L. Perkins, Introductory Note to
Appellate Body, supra note 2, at 119 (suggesting that states may use trade measures to protect
environmental resources in the global commons "so long as there is at least some jurisdictional
relationship between those resources and that WfO Member"); Asif H. Qureshi, Extraterritorial
Shrimps, NGOs and the WTO Appellate Body, 48 lNT L & COMP. L.Q. 199, 204 (1999) (reading the
'

Appellate Body opinion as "stipulating the need for a nexus between the State and the object of
environmental concern"); Benjamin Simmons, Note, In Search of Balance: An Analysis of the WTO
Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body Report, 24 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 413, 440 ( 1999) ("[l]t remains unclear

whether future panels will allow countries to implement measures protecting natural resources outside
their jurisdiction."); Wofford, supra note 16, at 584 (suggesting that "a nation may still need to prove
that its territory is affected by the environmental concern" to clear "the hurdle of jurisdiction").

•
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I n fact, the 1994 tuna-dolphin panel explicitly rejected any limitation o n the
scope of the Article XX exceptions based on the location of the natural
resources protected by the trade measure in question, because the panel
found no such limitation in the plain language of Article XX. 23

WTO

dispute settlement panels should similarly reject any such jurisdictional
requirement in the future.
As I have argued elsewhere, restrictions on imports produced by
environmentally harmful processes can protect important resources wholly
outside the jurisdiction of the importing country. 24

Some countries may

regulate their own fishing fleets to ensure that they provide optimal
protection for marine resources, but as long as these regulations raise costs
for the regulated producers and reduce their output, then these countries
must also support these regulations with trade measures against imported
seafood harvested using harmful practices. Otherwise, these imports would
displace sales of domestic seafood harvested subject to environmental
regulation.

Furthermore, fishing operations may move to unregulated

countries in order to avoid these environmental regulations. In the extreme,
if foreign seafood displaces domestic seafood entirely, then countries that
regulate succeed only in destroying their domestic fishing industry without
protecting the environment.
By not only regulating the domestic fishing industry but also shielding
it against those foreign competitors that use practices that harm the
environment, countries can ensure that their efforts to change the practices
of their own producers will not be in vain. Moreover, these trade measures
protect the environment by inducing foreign fishing fleets to reform their
practices in order to gain access to regulated markets.

Through these

effects on both domestic and foreign fishing fleets, the application of a
process standard to imports contributes to the protection of the global
environment.
B. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES OF THE EXPORTING COUNTRY
In the shrimp-turtle case, however, the United States banned shrimp
imports based on the environmental policies of the exporting country rather
than the processes used to harvest the particular shipment of shrimp in
question.
because

Therefore, the panel below ruled against the United States
it

was

"conditioning

access

to

23.

See 1994 Panel, supra note 12, paras. 5.15, .20.

24.

See Chang, Trade Measures, supra note 6, at 2177-78.

its

market ... upon

the
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adoption .. . of certain policies" by the exporting country's government. 25
The Appellate Body, however, explicitly and emphatically rejected this
rationale as an "error in legal interpretation" with "no basis" in the text of
Article XX. 26 The Appellate Body went so far as to declare that banning
imports based on whether the governments of exporting countries have
adopted policies "unilaterally prescribed" by the importing country is "a
common aspect" of Article XX measures.27 The Appellate Body conclu
ded that to hold that such unilateral import bans cannot fall within Article
XX would be "abhorrent," because it would render "most, if not all, of the
specific exceptions of Article XX inutile."28
Thus, the Appellate Body has indicated that countries may unilaterally
ban imports based not only on the process used in producing the particular
units in question but also on the environmental policies of the targeted

countries.

That is, the opinion apparently allows countries to impose a

unilateral import ban broader than a mere process standard. The opinion
acknowledges explicitly that while the dispute was before the panel and the
Appellate Body, the United States excluded even shrimp caught using
TEDs if the shrimp came from countries not certified by the United States.
While the Appellate Body expressed some concern about this ban, because
it

applied

even

to

imports

that

themselves

were

harvested

by

environmentally friendly processes, it did not state that such a ban was
necessarily a violation of GATT.Z9
The 1994 tuna-dolphin panel cited the same feature of the MMPA as
the reason that it ruled against the United States. The 1994 panel inferred
that the United States banned tuna imports "so as to force other countries to
change their policies" and held explicitly that those import bans therefore
fell outside Article XX.30

The Appellate Body made a similar inference

regarding the purpose of the U.S. ban on shrimp imports, but did not hold
25.

1998 Panel, supra note 10, para. 7.45.

26.

Appellate Body, supra note 2, paras.121-22.

27.

!d. para. 121.
!d.

28.
29.
30.

See infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.

1994 Panel, supra note 12, para. 5.27. Some observers had therefore suggested that the fact

that section 609 also "pressures harvesting nations to enact specific conservation laws" might "be its
downfall" before a WTO panel. David E. Kaczka, A Primer

011

the Shrimp-Sea Turtle Controversy, 6

REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & lNT'L ENYTL. L. 171, 177 (1997). See also Gregory Shaffer, Trade and the
Environment: Options for Resolving the WTO Shrimp-Turtle Case, 15 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 294, 299

(Feb. I 8, I 998) (suggesting that the WTO panel might deem the U.S. import ban to be a violation of the
GATT because the "country-wide scope" of this import ban "constitutes a form of coercion").

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
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outside Article XX.31 On the contrary,
that the U.S. measures therefore fell
that "a requirement that a country
declared
instead
the Appell ate Body
adopt a regulatory program requiring the use of TEDs" is "directly
connected with the policy of conservation of sea turtles."3 2 Thus,

consistent with the plain language of Article XX, the Appellate Body's
opinion allows for import bans designed to change the policies of other
governments. In fact, the opinion does not rule out the possibility that even

trade sanctions imposed with respect to products completely unrelated to
the marine resource in question may fall within Article XX if they are

intended to induce other countries to improve their efforts at conservation
of that resource.33
Importing countries can promote important environmental objectives
by requiring exporting countries to improve their conservation efforts as a
condition for access to domestic market of the importing country.34 When
process

standards

alone

are

not

effective

in

promoting

more

environmentally sound practices or policies, broader import bans are often
useful in inducing other countries to join multilateral agreements and to
comply with them.35 Other countries who harm the environment must have
some reason to come to the negotiating table and to sign an agreement,
especially given the powerful economic incentives for them to "free ride"
on the restraint exercised by the countries that do agree to regulate.36 The
types of trade measures condemned by past panels can create the incentives
3!.

See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text; infra note 39 and accompanying text. See

also Bruce Neuling, The Shrimp-Turtle Case: Implications for Article XX of GAIT and the Trade and
Environment Debate, 22 LOY. L.A. lNT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 45 (1999) (noting that the Appellate

Body "implicitly rejected" the reasoning of the 1994 panel).

32.

Appellate Body, supra note 2, para. 140. See Susan L. Sakmar, Free Trade and Sea Turtles:

The Imemational and Domestic Implications of the Shrimp-Turtles Case, 10 COLO. J. lNT'L ENVTL. L.

& PoL'Y 345, 345 (1999) (concluding that a WTO member may "impose its domestic environmental
regulations on another member so long as certain safeguards are met").

33.

For a defense of such trade sanctions, see Chang, Trade Measures, supra note 6, at 2199-

34.

For a comprehensive study of the role of import bans in promoting dolphin conservation, see

207.
Richard W. Parker, The Use and Abuse of Trade Leverage to Protect the Global Commons: What We
Can Learn From the Tuna-Dolphin Conflict, 12 GEO. lNT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1999).

35.

Broader import bans may also discourage environmentally harmful production processes

more effectively than process standards even without changing the environmental policies of foreign
governments. See Chang, Trade Measures, supra note 6, at 2178-84.

36.

We can offer "carrots" to countries that regulate, or we can threaten the use of "sticks"

against those that do not. The prospect of "carrots," however, would create perverse incentives to harm
the environment.

See Chang, International Externalities, supra note 6, at 312-21; Chang, Trade

Measures, supra note 6, at 2150-60.

2000]

39

ENVIRONMENTAL TRADE MEASURES

necessary for countries to join a multilateral agreement that Imposes
environmental regulations on them.37
There are, of course, devices other than trade measures that can induce
the cooperation of foreign governments, and a GATT prohibition on import
bans would not render the use of other sanctions illegal. Nevertheless,
many of these other sanctions may sacrifice other important interests or
have little effect on the governments of particular countries. Because other
sanctions on behalf of the environment may be costly or ineffective, trade
restrictions have proven particularly useful instruments in protecting
environmental interests. 38
C. DISCRIMINATION IN THE APPLICATION O F SECTION 609
Sensitive to these environmental objectives, the Appellate Body in the
shrimp-turtle case found the "general design and structure" of section 609
to be "reasonably related" to a "legitimate policy" of conservation, even if
it was designed to change the policies of other governments through a
unilateral import ban.39 The Appellate Body carefully identified problems

only in the particular way in which the executive branch applied this law to
shrimp exporting countries.4 0

In particular, the Appellate Body held that

the implementation of section 609 by the executive branch featured
"arbitrary

or

unjustifiable

discrimination

between

countries,"

which

violated the requirements set forth in the preamble to Article XX.4 1 Thus,
the Appellate Body avoided the use of any general per se rules against
environmental trade measures like the sweeping rules announced by panels
in the past. Instead, the Appellate Body endorsed a case-by-case analysis
that relies on the requirements explicit in the preamble in Article XX to
guard against the abuse of the Article XX exceptions,42 much as c1itics of
past panel decisions, including this author, have proposed.4 3

Given its

case-specific approach, the opinion is quite explicit regarding precisely
37.

See Chang, Trade Measures, supra note 6, at 2146-60.

38.

See id. at 2149; Chang, Intemational Externalities, supra note 6, at 323-24.

39.

Appellate Body, supra note 2, para. 141.

40.

See id. at 159 n.l28. Some commentary fails to make this distinction between the statute and

the application of the law by the executive branch. See, e.g., Eric L. Richards & Martin A. McCrory,
The Sea Turtle Dispute: Implications for Sovereignty, the Environment, and International Trade Law,

7 1 U. CoLO. L. REv. 295, 321 (2000) (stating that the Appellate Body held that "section 609 amounted
to 'unjustifiable discrimination'").

41.

GATT art. XX.

42.

See Appellate Body, supra note 2, para. 159 (endorsing a balance that "moves as the kind

and the shape of the measures at stake vary and as the facts making up specific cases differ").

43.

See, e.g., Chang, Trade Measures, supra note 6, at 2172-75; Steve Chamovitz, The

Environment vs. Trade Rules: Defogging the Debate, 23 ENYTL. L. 475,513-15 (1993).

40
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which particular features of the trade measure in question amount to
"arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination."

Furthermore, each objection

pertains to a discriminatory aspect of the U.S. policy and is thus tied to the
actual text of Article XX.4 4
First, although section 609 permits some flexibility in determining
whether an exporting country' s regulatory program is "comparable" to the
U.S. program, in practice U.S. officials only looked at whether the
country's policies were "essentially the same" as U.S. policies. 4 5 Officials
did not take into account other policies and measures that the country may
have adopted, nor did they consider different conditions that may exist in
that other country.46

Because this rigid approach to certification could

result in a ban on imports from a country with a different yet comparable
program, the Appellate Body held that this inflexibility amounted to
"arbitrary discrimination" among countries with comparable programs,

m

violation of the "chapeau"of Article XX. 47
Second, the United States failed to engage in "serious" negot1at10ns
with all affected countries before imposing its import ban.4 8
States did negotiate with

some

The United

countries to produce the Inter-American

Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles, concluded
in 1996, but not with other countries. 4 9

The result was "unjustifiable"

discrimination.5°
Third, the United States gave fourteen countries a three-year phase-in
period ( 199 1- 1994).51 The United States did not impose an import ban on
others until 1996, when it did so with only four months' notice.52 The
shorter
44.

phase-in

period

was

not

only

more

burdensome

but

also

Although this attention to the text of Article XX represents an improvement over past panel

decisions, some observers believe that the Appellate Body distorted the meaning of the term
''discrimination."

See, e.g., Simmons,

supra note 22, at 4 4 5 (arguing that the Appellate Body

·'expanded the term 'discrimination' ... to encompass all of its criticisms of the U.S. measure,
including criticisms that have no relation to the plain meaning of 'discrimination'").

45.

Appellate Body,

46.

See

47.

Jd. para. 177. For a critique of this reading of the term "discrimination," see Simmons, supra

supra note 2, para. 163.
id. para.164.

note 22, at 443 (arguing that while there is a text-based duty "not to discriminate between countries
where the conditions are the same, there is no affirmative duty
between countries are different").

supra note 2, para. 166.
id. para. 171.

48.

Appellate Body,

49.

See

50.
5 1.

!d. para. 172.
!d. para. 173.

52.

See id.

to discriminate where conditions

41
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accompanied by less effort by the United S tates to transfer TED technol ogy
3
to the exportmg cou ntnes . 5
0

0

The Appellate B ody held that these problems i n the application o f the
statute

"considered

in

their

discrimination" in v iolation

cumulative

effect"

of Article XX. 54

were

The

"unjustifiable

phrase

"in

their

cumulative effect" indicates that one of these defects standing alone would
not necessarily render the U . S . policy inconsistent with the GATT. Thus, if
the United States were to remedy these problems only on a prospective
basis, these reforms may be sufficient to eliminate the "unjus tifiable
discrimination" in the application of the U . S . import ban . 55
Finally, the Appellate B ody complained that the U . S . certification
process was not "transparent": there is "no formal opportunity for an
applicant country to be heard, or to respond to any arguments . . . made
against it," "no formal written , reasoned decision" with reasons for a denial
of certification, and "[n]o p rocedure for review of, or appeal from, a
denial. "56 Thus, the United S tates denied certification without a process to
ensure that the statute was "applied in a fair and just manner. "57

The

Appellate B ody concluded that denials under this procedure amounted to
"arbitrary discrimination. "58
D. UNILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL TRADE MEASURES
The Appellate B ody's c ritique of the U.S . implementation of section

609 has generated some commentary suggesting that "it is generally not
acceptable for one WTO Member to restrict trade based on the fail ure of
other Members to conform their natural resource conservation . . . p olicies
to the unilateral dictates of that WTO Member."59
53.
54.
55.

Eric Richards and

See id. para. 175.
/d. para. 176.
The WTO is unlikely to require anything more than prospective remedies for the second and

See Sydney M. Cone, III, The Appellate Body. the Protection of Sea Turtles and the
Technique of "Completing the Analysis ", J. WORLD TRADE, Apr. 1999, at 5 1, 56 (noting that "the fact
third problems.

of discriminatory treatment in the past may be difficult to redress in the present"). Thus, although the
complainants in the shrimp-turtle case have called upon the United States to lift its ban on shrimp
imports completely, see supra note

8, a lifting of the import ban is not necessary for the United States to

comply with the Appellate Body's ruling.

supra note 2, para. 180. For an insightful analysis of the requirement of
supra note 22, at 1057-67.
57. Appellate Body, supra note 2, para. 18 1.
58.
!d. para. 184.
59. Perkins, supra note 22, at 119. Unilateral environmental trade measures have been especially
controversial. See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Chief Hits Ow Against Unilateral Trade Measures, 15 Int'l
56.

Appellate Body,

transparency, see Hansen,

42

[Vol. 74:31

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

Martin McCrory, for example, assert that it is "permissible for a country to
adopt unilateral measures" only "in rare circumstances.':<Jo

They cite the

Appellate B ody ' s discussion of the general preference for multilateral
solutions to international environmental problems over unilateral action s . 61
The Appellate B ody pointed to the Inter-American Convention as evidence
that "an alternative course of action" featuring "cooperative efforts" rather
than

"the

unilateral

prohibition"

and

non-con sensual

under section

procedures

of

the

import

609 "was reasonably open to the United

S tates."62
The

Appellate

B ody's

opm10n,

however,

carefully

avoids

the

suggestion that unilateral measures generally fall outside Article XX. S uc h
a claim would b e inconsistent with earlier passages i n the s am e opinion
implying that such a rule w ould render "most, if not all, of the specific
exceptions of Article XX inutile" and thus would be "abhorrent." 63 S uch a
claim would also be incon s istent with the use of the singul ar noun i n
Article XX, which permits "any contracting party" t o adopt the measures i n
question, a n d with GATT case l a w , which has often found unilateral
measures to fall within Article XX.64

Nothin g in the language of Articl e

X X suggests that unilateral measures are illegal i f they are directed a t
resources outside the jurisdiction o f the importing country . 65
Therefore, when the Appellate Body referred to the alternative of
"cooperative efforts," 66 it did so only to underscore the feasibility of serious
n egotiations with all affected parties prior to the imposition of trade
Trade Rep. (BNA)

1058 (June 17, 1998) (reporting WTO chief Renata Ruggiero's criticism of

unilateral environmental trade measures).

the

60.
61.
62.
Nets,

Richards & McCrory, supra note 40, at 340-4 1.
See id. at 322 (quoting Appellate Body, supra note 2, paras. 168,171 ) .
Appellate Body, supra note 2, para. 171. See Arthur E. Appleton, Shrimp/Turtle: Untangling
2 J. lNT'L EcoN. L. 477,493 (1999) (concluding that the "need for a co-operative as opposed

to a unilateral approach is among the central points of the Appellate Body's finding that the US measure
constituted unjustifiable discrimination").

Thus, Charles Arden-Clarke of the World Wide Fund for

Nature International complained that the Appellate Body ruling "still prevents countries from taking
unilateral action on the global commons when irreversible environmental damage takes place." WTO
Appeals Body Faults Implementation of Shrimp-Turtle Law, 15 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1698, 1699
(Oct. 14, 1998).
63. Appellate Body, supra note 2, para. 121. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text. See
also Sakmar, supra note 32, at 383 (noting that "the WTO Appellate Body . . . recognized that unilateral
measures aimed at protecting the environment could be valid," because "if such measures were not
valid, the exceptions found in Article XX would be superfluous"); Wofford,

supra note 16, at 581

("[T]he Appellate Body asserted that unilateral environmental policies are not only legitimate, but also
to be expected under Article XX exceptions.").

64.
65.
66.

GATT art.

XX.

See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
Appellate Body, supra note 2, para. 171.
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measures. That is, the Appellate B ody pointed t o the Inter-American
Convention and this "cooperative" alternative only to criticize the failure of
the United States "to negotiate similar agreements with any other country
or group of countries. " 6 7 Thus, a failure to negotiate with all countries on
an equal basis may render a subsequent trade measure "a means of arbitrary
or unjustifiable

discrimination"

against

the

targeted

imports,

but

a

unilateral measure would not violate the GATT if even-handed negotiations
do p recede the imposition of the measure.
I I . U . S . EFFORTS TO C OMPLY WITH THE
SHRIMP-TURTLE RULING
The Appellate B ody ' s c ritique of the U . S . implementation of section

609 has also generated controversy regarding what reforms the United
S tates must undertake to bring itsel f into compliance with the GATT.

To

comply with the shrimp- turtle decision, the U . S . State Department vowed
to pursue negotiations with the four complainants in the sluimp-turtle case,
promised to provide technical assistance to them for the development of
TED

programs ,

and

proposed

revisions

to

its

guidelines

for

the

program

for

implementation of section 609.68 The proposed guidelines would ensure
consideration

of

evidence

that

an

exporting

country ' s

protecting sea turtles is comparable to the U . S . program in light of different
conditions or the use of methods other than TED requirements, provide
greater transparency and due process for nations seeking certification under
section 609, and allow the importation of shrimp harvested by vessels using
TEDs even if the exporting nation is not certified. 69 The United S tates has
allowed such shrimp imports since

1998, when the State Department

adopted this policy after the U . S . Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
vacated on

p rocedural

grounds

the

decision

International Trade prohibiting such irnports?0
67.

by

the

U.S.

C ourt

of

The State Department

!d. The Appellate Body does not address the question, "[H]ow much of a diplomatic effort

must the importing nation make?". Neuling, supra note 31, at 47. If a WTO panel finds that the
importing nation makes such efforts with all exporting nations on an equal basis, then the panel should
not engage in further scrutiny of the importing nation's efforts, given the meager basis in the text of
Article XX for such scrutiny. See Simmons, supra note 22, at 444 ("[T]here is currently no mandate
within the GATT to engage in bilateral and multilateral negotiations prior to taking unilateral actions.").
68.
See Notice of Proposed Revisions to Guidelines for the Implementation of Section 609 of
Public Law 101-162 Relating to the Protection of Sea Turtles in Shrimp Trawl Fishing Operations, 64
Fed. Reg. 14,481, 14,482 (proposed Mar. 25, 1999).
69. See id. at 14,481-82, 14,484.
70. See Earth Island Inst. v. Albright, 147 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1998), vacaring Earth
Island Inst. v. Christopher, 20 Ct. Int'l Trade 1221 (1996); Revised Notice of Guidelines for
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issued final guidelines in 1999 that affirmed this "shipment-by- shipment
exception," allowing shrimp imports if the individual shipment was caught
with the use of TEDs . 7 1
Environmentalists, however, advocate a "country-by-country" import
ban, arguing that a "shipment-by-shipment" approach will b e i neffective in
protecting sea turtles.72

The U . S . Court of International Trade ruled in

favor of environmentalist plaintiffs again in 1999, holdin g that section 609
permits the importation of wild shrimp only from certified nation s . 7 3
Richards and McCrory have called this holding "a decision that threatens to
sabotage United States compliance efforts . "7 4

They interpret the shrimp

turtle ruling to imply that the use of "trade leverage to force similar
regulations on . . . trading p artners" would "run afoul of GATT rules."75
To support this claim, they quote passages i n the Appellate Body' s decision
stating that the most conspicuous flaw in the "application" of section 609
"relates to its intended and actual coercive effect on the s pecific policy
decisions made by foreign governments . "7 6

S y dney Cone also infers that

Determining Comparability of Foreign Programs for the Protection of Sea Turtles in Shrimp Trawl
Fishing Operations, 63 Fed. Reg. 46,094, 46,094-95 (Aug. 28, 1998).
71.
Rossella Brevetti, State Department Issues Guidelines to Comply with WTO Shrimp Ban
Ruling, 16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1183, 1183 (July 14, 1999). See Revised Guidelines for the
Implementation of Section 609 of Public Law 101-162 Relating to the Protection of Sea Turtles in
Shrimp Trawl Fishing Operations, 64 Fed. Reg. 36,946, 36,948 (July 8, 1999).
72.
Rossella Brevetti, USTR to Consult with Interested Parties on How to Respond to Shrimp
Ruling, 15 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1768, 1768-69 (Oct. 21, 1998). Critics of the shipment-by-shipment
approach complain that it undermines "the i ncentive to create a national program" and encourages
"countries with existing national programs to abandon their all-encompassing programs." Jennifer A.
Bemazani, Note, The Eagle, the Ttmle, the Shrimp and the WTO: Implications for the Future of
Environmental Trade Measures, I S CONN. J. INT' L L. 207, 229 (2000).
73.
See Earth Island Inst. v. Daley, 48 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1081 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1 999). The Court
of International Trade, however, delayed "entry of j udgment on plaintiff s motion" until the
"defendants' annual report to Congress" pursuant to section 609, their report to the court on any
responses to the proposed guideline revisions, and "the presentment of evidence on or before July 2,
1999" regarding the enforcement of earlier guidelines. !d. See Rossella Brevetti, CIT Faults U.S.
Implementation of Wild Shrimp Import Ban, 16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 638 (Apr. 14, 1999). Citing
this litigation, Steve Chamovitz has suggested that compliance with the Appellate Body decision would
require "new legislation." Brevetti, supra note 72, at 1768. See Sakmar, supra note 32, at 387 ("Earth
Island' s continued challenge to the Guidelines issued by the United States will make it difficult for the
United States to comply easily with the WTO's ruling.").
Richards & M cCrory, supra note 40, at 325.
74.
75.
/d. at 333. See Brooks Ware, Staying Out of the Grasp of the GATT: Attempts to Protect
Animals at the Expense of Free Trade, CURRENTS , Winter 1998, at 69, 73 ("Section 609 ran afoul of
Article XX because the U.S. had been excluding shrimp caught with TEDs simply because the country
where the shrimp were caught had not been 'certified' by section 609.").
Appellate Body, supra note 2, para. 161. See Richards & McCrory, supra note 40, at 321.
76.
As a result of these passages, some observers consider the legality of a country-by-country i mport ban
"not so clear." Rosella Brevetti, U.S. Examining Ways to Make Restrictions on Shrimp Imports More
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the Appellate Body deemed a country-by-country import ban to be a
violation of the GATT.77

Therefore, Cone criticizes the Appellate Body,

which "seems to have lost sight of its own statement . . . that there is a
reasonable relationship between the US rules .. . ' and the legitimate p olicy
of conserving an . . . endangered species.' "7 8
If we read the Appellate Body ' s decision as cnticizmg the United
States for imposing a country-by-country ban, then this criticism would
indeed be inconsistent with earlier p assages in the same opinion?9

If we

read the Appellate Body ' s critical statements in context, however, we find
that the ruling does not obj ect to a country-by-country import b an per se.
Instead, the Appellate Body objects to the import ban on narrower grounds.
The Appellate Body ' s specific complaint is that the United S tates applies
this import ban to induce other countries to adopt "essentially the same
comprehensive regulatory regime as that applied by the United States to its
domestic shrimp trawlers" even though many of these countries "may be
differently situated." 80

It is this particular aspect of the "coercive effect"

of the application of section 609 that disturbs the Appellate Body.8 1
Therefore, the United States can apply a country-by-country import
ban as long as it allows an exporting country to argue that it is "differently
situated" so that its program for the protection of sea turtles may be
Transparent, 1 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 309, 3 1 0 (Feb. 24 , 1 999) (quoting one anonymous source as
stating that the Appellate Body' s decision "is kind of grey" on this issue).
77. See Cone, supra note 5 5 , at 53, 55, 5 8. According to Cone, "the Appellate Body' s
rationale . . . seems to be . . . that the measures taken by the United States were not in confonnity with
the chapeau because they were unilateral measures undermining the multilateral trading system." /d. at
57.

78. !d. (quoting Appellate Body, supra note 2, para. 1 4 1 ). Cone complains that "the Appellate
Body ignored the difficult question of whether vessel-specific (as opposed to country-by-country)
enforcement of the US regulations would be too limited" to protect sea turtles. !d. at 5 8. See Neuling,
supra note 3 1 , at 47 (complaining that "the suggestion that the U.S. Government should not exclude
shrimp caught with TEDs" will limit "the ability of the U.S. Government to influence environmental
practices abroad" and that "any system relying on shipment-by-shipment inspections . . . would be
vulnerable to fraud").
79. See supra notes 26-39 and accompanying text.
Appellate Body, supra note 2, para. 1 65 (noting that "shrimp caught using methods identical
80.
to those employed in the United Stares have been excluded from the United States market solely
because they have been caught in waters of countries that have not been certified by the United Scates "
and concluding from this fact that "this measure, in its application, is more concerned with effectively
influencing WTO Members to adopt essentially the same comprehensive regulatory regime as that
applied by the United States"). See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
81.
See Appellate Body, supra note 2, para. 1 6 1 (criticizing the embargo for requiring other
countries "to adopt essentially the same policy . . . as that applied to . . . United States domestic shrimp
trawlers").
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certified as "comparable" t o that of the United States.82 Thu s , t h e United
States would be in compliance with the Appell ate B o dy ' s ruling even if it
were to return to a country -by-country i mport ban, because it has already
revised

its

guidelines

certification .
transparency

to

allow

for

this

more

flexible

approach

to

This reform, together with reforms that ensure greater
in

the

certification

process,

equal

access

to

technical

assistance, and even-handed negotiations with exporting countries,

IS

sufficient to bring the United S tates into compliance with the GATT.
CONCLUSION
The Appellate B ody ' s ruling in the shrimp-turtle case i ndicates that
i mp011ing

countries

can

defend

environmental

trade measures-even

unilateral import b ans-under GATT Article XX as long as they avoid
unfair discrimination.

These unilateral trade measures may j us tifiably

discriminate against imports produced by processes that h ar m n atural
resources located outside the j urisdiction of the importing countries or
against imports from countries that have environmental policies deemed
inadequate by the importing country.

An exporting country c an chal lenge

such measures, however, if they are applied in a manner that amounts to
"arbitrary

or

unj ustifiable

discrimination

between

disguised restriction o n international trade."83
B ody ' s

ruling

holds

that

to

avoid

countries"

or

"a

In particular, the Appellate

"arbitrary

or

u nj ustifiable

discrimination," the country imposing a b an on imports from an e xporting
country must provide a formal hearing that allows the exporting country to
argue that it has comparable environmental policies even if they are not
precisely the s ame as the policies in the importing country , open serious
negotiations with all exporting countries on a equal basis, make the s ame
efforts to transfer technology to all exporting countries, and provide a
formal notice of the reasons for adverse decisions and some procedure for
review of or appeal from these denials.

B y basing

its

scrutiny of

82.
See Joseph Robert Berger, Note, Unilateral Trade Measures to Conserve the World 's Living
Resources: An Environmental Breakthrough for the GATT in the WTO Sea Turtle Case, 24 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 355, 376 (1999) (noting that "[t]he WTO focused on the combination of the nationwide
approach with the imposition of an inflexible. comprehensive regulatory program o n all targeted
nations" and suggesting that " [ i ] f the

United

States can address the latter problem," then

nationwide embargo approach might be accepted") (emphasis added).

"the

Peter Fugazzotto of the Earth

Island Institute has expressed the view that the shipment-by-shipment approach is not necessary for
compliance with the Appellate Body rul ing, but he concedes that "[ w )hether the A s i an nations agree
with that remains to be seen." Brevetti,

83.

GATT art. XX .

supra

note

76,

at

3 1 0.

I have argued elsewhere that these provisos, properly interpreted and

vigorously enforced, are sufficient to guard against the abuse of environmental trade measures for
protectionist purposes.

See

Chang,

Trade Measures, supra

note

6,

at

2 1 9�99.
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environmental trade measures only on requirements that me expl icit in the
text of Article XX of the G ATT, the Appellate B ody strikes a more
reasonable balance between environmental and trade i n terests than pane l s
in prior decisions have struck. T h e case-by-case approach endorsed by the
Appellate B ody should provide much broader leeway for the

use

environmental trade measures than s uggested by past pane l dec i s i o n s .

of

